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I. INTRODUCTION
Criminal prosecution has become an integral part of federal en-
forcement of this nation's environmental laws. In fiscal year 1991, the
United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) reported record
criminal fines.1 From 1987 to 1991, prison time and criminal fines
* Phillip B. Scott and S. Benjamin Bryant are Assistant United States Attorneys for
the Southern District of West Virginia. The opinions expressed in this Article are those of
the authors and not those of the United States Department of Justice. The authors would
like to thank Pamela Hudson, Paralegal Specialist, and Syvonne Carlson, Secretary, for their
work on this Article. The authors also acknowledge the many people who reviewed or
otherwise helped in the Article's preparation.
1. Frank E. Allen, Few Big Firms Get Jail 7me for Polluting, WALL ST. J., Dec. 9,
O •
O O
• O
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imposed in cases investigated by EPA more than quadrupled.2 Many
commentators have noted, often with chagrin, the trend toward more
frequent criminal prosecution.
3
The reasons for this upsurge are both straightforward and compel-
ling. One is society's recognition that those who illegally despoil our
environment for financial gain must be severely punished. In a survey
taken by the United States Department of Justice (DOJ) in 1984, the
1991, at 61.
2. Id, For an insider's look at the roots of the federal environmental prosecutorial ef-
fort, see Judson W. Starr, Turbulent imes at Justice and EPA: The Origins of Environ-
mental Criminal Prosecutions and the Work that Remains, 59 GEo. WASH. L. Ray. 900
(1991).
3. See, e.g., Paul G. Nittoly, Current Trends in the Prosecution of Environmental
Offenses, ALI-ABA Course of Study: Criminal Enforcement of Environmental Laws 355
(April 1990); James P. Calve, Environmental Crimes: Upping the Ante for Noncompliance
with Environmental Laws, 133 MIL. L. REV. 279 (1991); Truxtun Hare, Reluctant Soldiers:
The Criminal Liability of Corporate Officers for Negligent Violations of the Clean Water
Act, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 935 (1990); Gerald Krovatin, Criminal Environmental Investiga-
tions: Caution Flags for Corporate Managers, 12 CARDOZo L. REV. 1291 (1991); Frederick
W. Addison, III & Elizabeth E. Mack, Creating an Environmental Ethic in Corporate Amer-
ica: The Big Stick of Jail Time, 44 Sw. L.J. 1427 (1991); Robert W. Adler & Charles
Lord, Environmental Crimes: Raising the Stakes, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 781 (1991); Ste-
yen M. Morgan & Allison K. Obermann, Perils of the Profession: Responsible Corporate
Officer Doctrine May Facilitate a Dramatic Increase in Criminal Prosecutions of Environ-
mental Offenders, 45 Sw. LJ. 1199 (1991); Thomas J. Kelly, Jr. & Nancy A. Voisin, En-
forcement Trends, ALI-ABA Course of Study: Criminal Enforcement of Environmental Laws
21 (Sept. 1992); James R. Moore & Perkins Coie, Environmental Criminal Statutes: An
Effective Deterrent? ALI-ABA Course of Study: Criminal Enforcement of Environmental
Laws 137 (Sept. 1992); Robert I. McMurry & Stephen D. Ramsey, Environmental Crime:
The Use of Criminal Sanctions in Enforcing Environmental Laws, 19 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
1133 (1986); Richard J. Leon, Environmental Criminal Enforcement A Mushrooming Cloud,
63 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 679 (1989); Stephen D. Brown & Alison M. Benders, Note, From
the Field: How to Handle a Complex Criminal Environmental Case, 1 VILL. ENVTL. L.J.
149 (1990); Robert D. Fluharty & Robert E. Lannan, Criminal Liability for Environmental
Law Violations by Coal Operators, 93 W. VA. L. REV. 599. (1991); Roger J. Marzulla &
Brett G. Kappel, Nowhere to Run, Nowhere to Hide: Criminal Liability for Violations of
Environmental Statutes in the 1990s, 16 CoLum. J. ENVTL. L. 201 (1991); Mary E. Kris &
Gail L. Vannelli, Today's Criminal Environmental Enforcement Program: Why You May Be
Vulnerable and Why You Should Guard Against Prosecution Through an Environmental
Audit, 16 COLuM. J. ENVTL. L. 227 (1991); R. Christopher Locke, Environmental Crimes:
The Absence of "Intent" and the Complexities of Compliance, 16 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 311
(1991); Judson W. Starr & Nancy Voisin, Toward An Environmental Voluntary Disclosure
Program, 16 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 333 (1991).
[Vol. 95:663
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public ranked environmental crimes as more severe than both armed
robbery and heroin smuggling.4 In the past decade, the major federal
environmental statutes have been systematically amended to add stiffer
criminal penalties.5 The citizenry has demanded action.
The second and more compelling reason for prosecution is the
dramatic deterrent effect that these cases can have. While civil fines
undoubtedly affect corporate behavior, too often they can be dismissed
as just another cost of doing business. As former Attorney General
Richard Thornburgh recognized, "We are finding that nothing so con-
centrates the mind of responsible management upon the environment as
our putting their own pocketbooks and persons in jeopardy. Indeed, the
sudden realization that culpable mismanagement might actually result
in jail time concentrates such minds even more.",6 In the more colorful
words of one commentator, environmental prosecutions force corporate
executives to face the "sorts of penalties that make pin-striped decision
makers go pale."7 Moreover, these prosecutions can be controver-
sial-focusing public attention on environmental issues in general and,
more specifically, on the policy of actually jailing persons for environ-
mental crimes.8
4. Bureau of Justice Statistics, BULLETIN (U.S. Dep't of Justice) (1984), cited in
McMurry & Ramsey, supra note 3, at 1158 n.152.
5. See Marzulla & Kappel, supra note 3, at 204-06; Resource Recovery and Conser-
vation Act (RCRA), Pub. L. 94-580, 90 Stat. 2795 (1976) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-
6986 (1988)) as amended by the Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984, Pub. L.
No. 98-616, 98 Stat. 3221 (1984) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6991i (1988)); Compre-
hensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, Pub. L. 96-510,
94 Stat. 2767 (1980) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (1988 & Supp.
1991)); Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100
Stat. 1613 (1986) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 10, 26, 29, 33, & 42
U.S.C.); Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 62 Stat. 1155 (1948) (codified as amended at
33 U.S.C. §§ 1151-1325 (1988 & Supp. 1991)); Clean Air Act, 69 Stat. 322 (1955) (codi-
fied as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671 (1988 & Supp. 1991)).
6. Richard Thornburgh, Our Blue Planet. A Law Enforcement Challenge, Keynote
Address at 1991 Department of Justice Environmental Law Enforcement Conference (Jan. 8,
1991), quoted in Marzulla & Kappel supra note 3, at 201-02; see also F. Henry Habicht II,
The Federal Perspective on Environmental Criminal Enforcement: How to Remain on the
Civil Side, 17 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,478, 10,480 (Dec. 1987); McMurry &
Ramsey, supra note 3, at 1158-59; Starr, supra note 2, at 900.
7. Mark Muro, What Punishment Fits a Corporate Crime?, Boston Globe, May 7,
1989, at Al, A6, cited in Adler & Lord, supra note 3, at 796.
8. Probably the most famous example of this phenomenon is United States v.
1993]
3
Scott and Bryant: Criminal Enforcement of the Clean Water Act in the Coal Fields: U
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1993
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 95:663
The recent case of United States v. Law9 is a prime example."°
Lewis R. Law, owner of Mine Management, Inc., was convicted for
felony violations of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, common-
ly known as the Clean Water Act (CWA)." Law was sentenced to
two years in prison, and he and his small company, which was also
convicted, were assessed, a total of $160,000 in fines."2 The case and
the resultant strong penalties touched off a spirited public debate over
the propriety, and, for that matter, the legality of the prosecution.
1 3
The National Review, a noted conservative publication, charged that
the theory of prosecution "appears to be a complete perversion of the
principles of common law."'" Ben Greene, President of the West Vir-
ginia Mining and Reclamation Association called the sentence "a trav-
esty of justice . . . . the furthest extreme of anything in this whole
broad category of environmental affairs.""5 How is that for spirited
debate?
The Fourth Circuit's affirmance of the convictions in Law should
put the National Review and Mr. Greene at ease.1 6 Regardless, the
Pozsgai, 897 F.2d 524 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 812 (1990). In Pozsgai, the defen-
dant, after repeated warnings from environmental officials, placed clean fill material on five
acres of his own property that were protected as wetlands under the Clean Water Act
(CWA). The property had previously been used as a dump site. Pozsgai was convicted of
felony violations of the CWA and sentenced to three years in jail and fined $202,000.
Because of the defendant's inability to pay, the fine was ultimately reduced to $5,000. 22
Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,772 (E.D. Pa. 1992). The public outcry both for and
against the prosecution brought the issues of environmental prosecution and the federal
government's regulation of wetlands to the forefront of public discussion. See Adler & Lord,
supra note 3, at 784-86; Marzulla & Kappel, supra note 3, at 215-16.
9. 979 F.2d 977 (4th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1844 (1993).
10. A word of caution: the authors represented the United States both at trial and on
direct appeal in Law. This experience obviously informs and influences our evaluation of
the case's importance.
11. 62 Stat. 1155 (1948) (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1152-1387 (1988 &
Supp. 1991)).
12. Law, 979 F.2d at 978.
13. See Paul Nyden, Judge to Spell Out Pollution Sentence: Defendant Says That He's
a Fall Guy, CHARLESTON GAZETTE, Jan. 16, 1992, at IC; Paul Nyden, Engineer to Remain
Free During Appeal of Felony Water Pollution, CHARLESTON GAZETTE, Apr. 2, 1992, at
10A.
14. Peter Samuel, Bankrupted by EPA, NAT'L REV., Mar. 16, 1992, at 38, 39.
15. Paul Nyden, Man to Begin Sentence for Polluting, CHARLESTON SUNDAY GA-
ZETTE-MAIL, Dec. 6, 1992, at 12A.
16. Such is certainly not the case, however, at least insofar as the NATIONAL REVIEW
4
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publicity surrounding the prosecution has focused the attention of the
public, as well as that of legal commentators, on the importance of
CWA compliance in the coal fields. Likewise, the devastating and,
thus far, intractable problem of the acid mine drainage (AMD) atten-
dant to coal mining is once again in the limelight. We believe the case
signals the next step in CWA enforcement in the coal fields and
should lead to better CWA compliance. Ideally, the result will be real
progress in addressing the AMD problem.
This Article sets forth the bases for these beliefs. After a brief
review of the AMD problem in Appalachia 17 and the CWA in gener-
al, 8 the Article will focus in some detail on the facts in Law. 9 A
complete understanding of those facts illuminates the court's decision
and will, we believe, dispel the seemingly uninformed criticism of the
case. Next, Law's import both for the CWA and for CWA enforce-
ment are discussed.20 Finally, we will chart what we see as the future
of the CWA inthe coal fields.2
II. AMD PROBLEM
Quite possibly the most adverse environmental consequence of
bituminous coal mining is the generation of AM. 22 Appalachian
is concerned. Upon hearing of the court's decision, Peter Samuel expressed his view that
Mr. Law was the victim of "unscrupulous prosecutors just out for scalps for display to
appease environmental zealots." Peter Samuel, Letters, NAT'L REv., Feb. 1, 1993, at 4. The
NATIONAL REVIEW then called for a presidential pardon of Law, maintaining that imprison-
ment of "so-called" 'environmental criminals,'" such as Law, was an injustice rising to the
level of "a serious human rights problem." Public Enemies, NAT'L REv., Feb. 1, 1993, at
16, 17.
17. See infra notes 22-41.
18. See infra notes 43-57.
19. See infra notes 58-91.
20. See infra notes 92-121.
21. See infra notes 122-145.
22. Patrick C. McGinley & Thomas J. Sweet, Acid Coal Mine Drainage: Post Pollu-
tion and Current Regulation, 17 DuQ. L. REv. 67, 68 (1978-79). For other legal comment
on AMD, see Michael D. Bryan, Note, Toward Strict Liability for Abandoned Mine Drain-
age, 71 KY. LJ. 193 (1982-83); Dorinda G. Dallmeyer, Note, A New Legislative Approach
for the Control of Acid Mine Drainage, 17 GA. L. REV. 969 (1983); J.T. Begley & John
Philip Williams, Coal Mine Water Pollution: An Acid Problem with Murky Solutions, 64
19931
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coals and their related overburden frequently contain sulfur in the form
of iron sulfide minerals.23 Once these strata are disturbed by mining,
the sulfide minerals are exposed to oxygen and water and an acid-
forming chemical reaction is triggered. The sulphur reacts with oxygen
and water to form sulfuric acid. The resulting acidic solution generally
lowers the pH of streams and raises the amount of ionized metals
in solution.25 In particular, as a direct result of this reaction, large
amounts of soluble iron are generated.26
The effects of this bit of elementary chemistry have been wide-
spread and devastating to the streams of the coal fields. A 1969 study
determined that at least 10,000 miles of streams had been degraded by
AMD.' The increased acidity of Appalachian waters has increased
water treatment costs, corroded bridge supports, locks, dams, and water
treatment* facilities, and proven deadly to aquatic life.2' The iron
KY. L.J. 507 (1976).
23. For a brief discussion of AMD chemistry, see V. P. Evangelou & Gwendelyn
Geidel, Acid-Mine Drainage/Quality: The Problem, the Chemistry, the Field Settings, the
Treatment and Potential Solutions, Workshop Manual of Institute for Mining and Minerals
Research University of Kentucky 1-4 (Aug. 1990); Ronald L. Hill & Edward R. Bates, Acid
Mine Drainage and Subsidence: Effects of Increased Coal Utilization, E.P.A. 600/2-78-068,
Office of Research and Development, U.S.E.P.A., 5-9 (April 1978); E.P.A. Design Manual:
Neutralization of Acid Mine Drainage, E.P.A.-600/2-83-001, Office of Research and Devel-
opment, U.S.E.P.A., 1-5 (Jan. 1983); Michael Baker, Jr., Inactive & Abandoned Under-
ground Mines: Water Pollution Prevention & Control, 9-21, E.P.A. 440/9-75-007, U.S.E.P.A.
(June 1975).
24. One method of determining the acidity of water is by measuring its hydrogen ion
concentration, symbolized as "pH". Technically, "pH" is the negative logarithm of the effec-
tive hydrogen ion concentration in gram equivalents per liter. WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COL-
LEGE DICTIONARY 880 (1988). A pH value of seven is neutral, with values of less than
seven being exponentially more acidic and values of seven to fourteen being exponentially
more basic. For example, an aqueous solution with a pH of four is ten times more acidic
than a solution with a pH of five but only one-tenth as acidic as a solution with a pH of
three. See generally WILLIAM L. MASTERTON ET AL., CHEMICAL PRINCIPLES 400-427 (5th
ed. 1981).
25. Hill & Bates, supra note 23, at 5.
26. Id.; Begley & Williams, supra note 22, at 511; see also Commonwealth v. Barnes
& Tucker Co., 371 A.2d 461, 465-66 n.9 (Pa. 1977).
27. U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR, ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS OF UNDERGROUND MINING
AND MINERAL PROCESSING 97 (Jan. 29, 1971), cited in Begley .& Williams, supra note 22,
at 512; see also Baker, supra note 23, at 5.
28. McGinley & Sweet, supra note 22, at 69-70; Hill & Bates supra note 23, at 7-8;
6
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eventually settles out of the streams as "yellow-boy," smothering
streambeds and all that live there.29
The cost of remedying the AMD problem has been estimated in
the billions." The aesthetic loss is immeasurable. In the words of
another, "[n]owhere is the human cost of water pollution more appar-
ent than along the banks of the red, silt-choked streams of the Appala-
chian coal fields.",
31
A unique aspect of AMD is that, unlike other industrial pollution
sources, it continues long after operations have ceased.32 So long as
the sulfide bearing strata remain exposed to oxygen and water, AMD
will be generated; so long, as this drainage reaches streams, AMD
pollution will continue.33 The continuous nature of AMD is the root
of Appalachia's stream quality problem. It has been estimated that as
much as seventy-eight percent of AMD is caused by post-mining dis-
charges.
34
This unique characteristic also explains why, thus far, the CWA
and the federal Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977
(SMCRA)35 have had only limited success in ameliorating the AMD
problem. Both SMCRA and the CWA, as enforced, have required
ongoing mining operations to treat AMD discharges.36 Moreover, to
combat the perpetual nature of AMD, SMCRA requires reclamation of
the surface effects of mining. Also, all surface mining operations are
Baker, supra note 23, at 23 n.22.
29. Bryan, supra note 22, at 194-95; McGinley & Sweet, supra note 22, at 69; Baker,
supra note 23, at 23.
30. Begley & Williams, supra note 22, at 512, cited in McGinley & Sweet, supra
note 22, at 70; American Mining Congress v. EPA, 965 F.2d 759, 766 (9th Cir. 1992)
(citing H.R. REP. No. 218, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 135 (1977), reprinted in 1977
U.S.C.C.A.N. 593, 597 (cost of rehabilitating abandoned coal mines)).
31. Begley & Williams, supra note 22, at 512, quoted in McGinley & Sweet, supra
note 22, at 69-70.
32. Hill & Bates, supra note 23, at 6.
33. McGinley & Sweet, supra note 22, at 70.
34. 46 Fed. Reg. 3136, 3144 (1981), cited in Bryan, supra note 22, at 193 n.1.
35. 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (1988).
36. The CWA regulates all discharges of pollutants from point sources into waters of
the United States. See infra notes 40-53. The SMCRA requires all surface discharges from
mining operations to be treated per CWA standards. 30 C.F.R. § 816.42 (1992).
7
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required to be designed to prevent continuous gravity-driven post-min-
ing discharges of AMD.37 However, the problem of AMD from thou-
sands of abandoned mine sites has been left largely unaddressed.
By its plain language, the CWA regulates discharges whether from
active or abandoned mine sites; however, CWA compliance efforts
have focused on active sites.38 SMCRA's reclamation requirements
apply only to mines active after August 3, 1977.39 SMCRA also es-
tablished an Abandoned Mine Reclamation Fund to clean-up older
abandoned mining sites.' However, the fund does nothing to regulate
AMD discharges prior to reclamation. Also, many abandoned sites do
not qualify for the fund or have not yet been reclaimed.41
This regulatory gap may now be closing. The Law prosecution and
regulations promulgated pursuant to the most recent amendments to the
CWA (which are discussed below)42 both deal with abandoned mine
operations. Both also foretell increased AMD enforcement efforts.
III. THE CLEAN WATER ACT
The CWA was extensively overhauled in 1972 to create the com-
prehensive water pollution control system in place today.43 Congress
declared the statutory objective to be the restoration and maintenance
of the "chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's
waters"44 and established as its lofty goal the complete elimination of
discharges of pollutants into navigable waters.45
37. 30 U.S.C. § 1266 (1988).
38. McGinley & Sweet, supra note 22, at 87-97; Mary J. Hackett, Remining and the
Water Quality Act of 1987: Operators Beware!, 13 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 79, 115-17 (1987).
39. 30 U.S.C. § 1252 (1988).
40. 30 U.S.C. §§ 1231-43 (1988 & Supp. 1991).
41. West Virginia Nonpoint Source Assessment, W. Va. Dep't of Nat. Resources Div.
of Water Resources 111-3 (Aug. 1989) (3,973 abandoned mine land problem areas in West
Virginia alone).
42. See infra notes 122-42.
43. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500,
86 Stat. 816 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. § 1251-65, 1281-92, 1311-1328, 1341-1345,
1361-1376 (1987 & Supp. 1991)).
44. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1988 & Supp. 1991).
45. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1) (1988 & Supp. 1991). This represented a major policy
[Vol. 95:663
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To this end, the CWA established a comprehensive program for
regulating water pollution, the "cornerstone" of which is the National
Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit program.'
The program regulates all discharges of pollutants from "point sourc-
es,,,4 establishing limits on the amount of pollutants that can be re-
leased from a point source.s A "point source" is defined in the
CWA as "any discernable, confined and discrete conveyance... [such
as a pipe, ditch, or discrete fissure] from which pollutants are or may
be discharged. '49 Discharges not from point sources lie outside the
NPDES permit program.
50
The CWA makes it illegal for any person to discharge52 a pol-
lutant 3 from a point source into a navigable water of the United
States, 4unless that person has a NPDES permit and the discharge is
shift from the original CWA passed in 1948. There, Congress assumed that waste disposal
was a fundamental use of water. Pub. L. No. 89-234, § 5(a), 79 Stat. 907, cited in John P.
C. Fogarty, A Short History of Federal Water Pollution Control Law, in CLEAN WATER
DESKBOOK, Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) (1988).
46. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 822 F.2d 104, 108 (D.C. Cir.
1987).
47. 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (1988 & Supp. 1991).
48. 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (1988 & Supp. 1991). Uniform effluent limitations have been
promulgated by EPA for discharges from active mining operations. See 40 C.F.R. §§
434.10, 434.11(b), 440.132(g) (1991). No such uniform limits have been set for inactive
mine discharges. American Mining Congress v. Environmental Protection Agency, 965 F.2d
759, 767 (9th Cir. 1992).
49. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (1988 & Supp. 1991). This term has been broadly interpret-
ed "to facilitate the identification of any path by means of which pollutants might enter the
waters of the United States," United States v. Earth Sciences, Inc., 599 F.2d 368, 373 (10th
Cir. 1979), including naturally formed gullies. Sierra Club v. Abston Constr. Co., 620 F.2d
41, 45 (5th Cir. 1980).
50. National Wildlife Fed'n v. Consumers Power Co., 862 F.2d 580, 587 (6th Cir.
1988); Shanty Town Assocs. Ltd. Partnership v. EPA, 843 F.2d 782, 791 (4th Cir. 1988).
51. This term includes individuals, corporations, partnerships, and state and local gov-
ernmental entities. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(5) (1988).
52. Defined at 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12) (1988) in part as "any addition of any pollutant
to navigable waters from any point source."
53. The term pollutant is defined by a long list of substances, including chemical
wastes and industrial wastes, discharged into water. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6) (1988). The related
term "pollution" means the man-made or man-induced alteration of the chemical, physical,
biological, and radiological integrity of water. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(19) (1988).
54. This means waters of the United States, 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (1988), and includes
waters that do not meet the traditional tests of navigability. In fact, the CWA applies to all
9
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in compliance with the permit"5 Both civil and criminal penalties are
established for those persons who violate the strict prohibition against
unpermitted discharges. In particular, the CWA was amended in 1987
to make it a -felony for any person to:
1) knowingly5 6
2)" discharge
3) a pollutant
4) from a point source
5) into a navigable water of the United States
6) without a NPDES permit.57
In Law, the defendants were convicted of sixteen violations of this
prohibition. The discharges were AMD and came from water collection
and treatment ponds associated with an abandoned coal operation. A
detailed review of the specifics of the site will shed light on Law's
applicability to the abandoned mine site AMD problem prevalent
throughout the coal fields.
water bodies within the United States, including streams and tributaries. See generally Unit-
ed States v. Earth Sciences, Inc. 599 F.2d 368 (10th Cir. 1979); United States v. Ashland
Oil, 504 F.2d 1317 (6th Cir. 1974); United States v. Oxford Royal Mushroom Products, 487
F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Pa. 1980); United States v. Phelps Dodge, 391 F. Supp. 1181, 1187 (D.
Ariz. 1975).
55. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a), 1342 (1988 & Supp. 1991); Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 112 S.
Ct. 1046, 1054 (1992).
56. This is a general intent standard. The United States does not have to prove that a
defendant had a specific intent to violate the CWA. It is sufficient to prove only that a
defendant knew that he was discharging some noninnocuous effluent, regardless of whether
or not that defendant was aware of the proscriptions of the CWA. See generally United
States v. Dee, 912 F.2d 741, 745-46 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1307 (1991)
(interpreting RCRA). Simply put, in the environmental arena, "ignorance of the law is no
defense." Id. at 745 (citing United States v. International Minerals & Chem. Corp., 402 U.S.
558, 565 (1971)). The law has taken this seemingly unforgiving course because whenever
"dangerous or deleterious devices or products or obnoxious waste materials are involved, the
probability of regulation is so great that anyone who is aware that he is in possession of
them or dealing with them must be presumed to be aware of the regulation." International
Minerals, 402 U.S. at 565.
57. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(2)(B) (1988).
10
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IV. THE FACTS OF LAW
In 1977, Law, a real estate broker with a background in engineer-
ing,5" formed Mine Management, Inc. (MM1) to engage in various
business activities related to the coal industry. 9 Shortly thereafter,
MMI leased the right to recover coal from slurry ponds and refuse
piles on property owned by the New River Company located at
Summerlee, Fayette County, West Virginia.60 In April 1980, MMI
purchased 241 acres of the surface of this site from New River Com-
pany. The conveyance included an aged coal preparation plant, several
buildings (including the old "company store"), various ponds, and coal
refuse piles.61 In the deed to the property, MMI also assumed:
any and all liability, present and future, excluding any liability for any
action or proceeding presently pending in any Court of record, Magistrate's
Court, or any administrative tribunal in this State, for all environmental
and safety matters, including but not limited to, air pollution, water pollu-
tion... arising out of the ownership or use of the property conveyed,
which includes all possible future claims that may be asserted by...
[designated state and federal agencies].62
For a number of years after the purchase, MMI leased the proper-
ty to a series of companies for the purpose of engaging in coal related
activities.63 At one point, one company subleased "the abandoned re-
fuse pile" to "reprocess" coal from it.64 However, no coal was taken
from the pile and no coal related activity had been conducted on the
site for several years prior to the federal criminal trial.
58. Joint Appendix at 379-81, 446, United States v. Law, 979 F.2d 977 (4th Cir.
1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1844 (1993) [hereinafter JA..
59. J.A., supra note 58, at 497-501 (Certificate of Incorporation for Mine Management
Inc.). Mr. Law was the only officer and sole shareholder of MMI since its inception. J.A.,
supra note 58, at 377. All acts of MMI in this matter were those of Law himself. L. 378-
79.
60. Ia at 69-71, 311-12, 502-09.
61. L. at 510, 514-20.
62. Id at 517.
63. Id, at 303, 525-27, 530.
64. ld at 530.
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The history of the Summerlee site is fairly typical of abandoned
coal mining sites in West Virginia. The New River Company operated
a deep mine, known as the Lochgelly mine, at the site for many de-
cades. Coal mining activities of various types had been conducted, at
different times, on property adjacent to the Summerlee site. For many
years, New River Company also operated a coal preparation plant that
was used to process coal from the Lochgelly mine, as well as coal
transported to the site by rail and truck from other mines. Refuse from
coal processing was dumped at the site, resulting in a refuse, or gob
pile, covering approximately 100 acres of surface, averaging 100 feet
in depth, and filling three valleys on the side of the mountain.65 Coal
from numerous mining sites and seams were processed at the prep-
aration plant; consequently, the refuse pile contained refuse and coal
from varying seams processed by varying coal preparation technologies
used over the decades.66 The headwaters of two creeks, Wolf and
Arbuckle, are located near the foot of this large refuse pile. Each
creek is a tributary of the New River.
AMD leached from the refuse pile and entered the headwaters of
the creeks, primarily draining to Wolf Creek.67 In order to alleviate
this problem, New River Company constructed a collection pond below
the foot, or face, of the gob pile on the Wolf Creek side of the moun-
tain.6 18 Originally, New River Company merely pumped the AMD col-
lected in the Wolf Creek pond over the ridge and discharged the wa-
ter, without treatment, into Arbuckle Creek. This was done because the
water quality of Wolf Creek, the source for the Town of Fayetteville's
public water system, was of greater concern to authorities than the
quality of Arbuckle Creek.
In 1979, in response to heightened enforcement efforts by state
authorities, New River Company installed a series of ponds on the
Arbuckle Creek side of the mountain to treat the AMD.6 9 AMD col-
lected in the Wolf Creek pond was pumped to the Arbuckle ponds,
65. Id at 56-57, 65-69, 173, 196, 224-25, 528, 535-40.
66. Id. at 56-57, 65-69, 224-25.
67. Id at 97-98, 532-34, 199-213, 215-16, 536.
68. I& 65-69.
69. Id. 68-69, 89.
[Vol. 95:663
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where it was channeled through a hopper filled with soda ash bri-
quettes. The soda ash reduced the acidity of the water, which then
flowed through settling ponds, where, with the pH raised, high concen-
trations of metals precipitated out of the water and settled in the
ponds. From the last settling pond, the treated water was discharged
into the headwaters of Arbuckle Creek.70 Without pumping, the col-
lection pond on the Wolf Creek side would overflow, discharging
AMD into Wolf Creek. Figure 1, shown at Appendix A, is a schemat-
ic of this treatment system.
71
Discharges from the system into Arbuckle Creek were authorized
under a NPDES permit issued by EPA and a West Virginia Water
Pollution Control Permit issued by the State to New River Compa-
ny.72 The treatment system and permits were in place when MMI
purchased the property in April 1980.73
Evidence at trial was conflicting with respect to the ultimate
source of the AMD entering the Wolf Creek collection pond. Prosecu-
tion experts testified that AMD leached from the face of the huge
refuse pile, at least in part, as a result of rain falling on the pile's
largely unreclaimed surface, and the migration of water through the
pile.74 Defense experts countered that the refuse pile did not generate
any AMD; rather, the AMD collected in the Wolf Creek pond came
from sub-surface springs contaminated as a result of mining activities
on properties adjacent to MMI's site.75 One engineering study used
by the defense claimed the AMD resulted from up-mountain spring
water that leached iron from the refuse as it migrated through the
pile.76 Moreover, Law maintained that even if the gob pile produced
AMD he had no responsibility to treat it because, as the owner of
70. Id. at 89-90.
71. This figure is modeled after one found in a report prepared by John Michalovic, a
chemist who testified at trial. See id. at 190-216.
72. Since 1982, the 'West Virginia Division of Environmental Protection (DEP) and its
predecessor agencies have been delegated primary authority from EPA to administer the
NPDES program. See 40 C.F.R. § 123.62 (1991).
73. J.A., supra note 58, at 121-22, 522-27.
74. Id at 199-216.
75. Id at 275-94.
76. Id. at 97-98, 532-34.
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only the surface of the property, he had no duty to treat pollutants
generated in the subsurface77
Regardless of the ultimate source of the AMD that found its way
into the Wolf Creek collection pond, there was no dispute that MM]
and Law failed to operate the treatment system during substantial
periods of time from May 1980 through 1991, and consequently AMD
entered both Wolf and Arbuckle Creeks.78 Likewise, there was no
real dispute that the ponds were on the surface and that they constitut-
ed point sources under the CWA. 9
Beginning as early as late 1980, the West Virginia Department of
Natural Resources 0 repeatedly informed Law and MMI that a
NPDES permit was required and any discharges had to be within per-
missible limits.81 State authorities filed civil enforcement actions
against MIfl in 1984, 1988, and 1991. In 1983, Law was prosecuted
in the Magistrate Court of Fayette County, and charged with a misde-
meanor violation of the state water pollution statute.82 Law was con-
victed in magistrate court, but, on his appeal to the Circuit Court of
Fayette County, the matter was dropped by the prosecuting attorney's
office. Despite these urgings by state authorities, neither Law nor MM]
ever obtained a NPDES permit.83
In the federal criminal trial, the primary defenses raised concerned
the source of the AMD and the location of the collection ponds. De-
fendants argued that unless the United States could prove that the
AMD in their ponds was generated by property under their control,
they were not legally responsible to abate the discharges." They also
contended that, prior to the creation of the gob pile, Arbuckle and
77. Id. at 444.
78. Id. at 135-64.
79. Id. at 444-46.
80. This agency is the predecessor of the DEP and oversaw the water quality program
in West Virginia prior to the creation of DEP.
81. L.A., supra note 58, at 151-154, 175-79, 444-46.
82. Id. at 31-43, 175-79, 357-60.
83. Id. at 153.
84. Brief of Defendant at 23-32 (hereinafter Def. Br.), United States v. Law, 979 F.2d
977- (4th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1844 (1993).
[Vol. 95:663676
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Wolf Creeks extended through the area now under the pile.'- Conse-
quently, they argued that the ponds were actually parts of the creeks,
which creeks were contaminated by AMD from their very source.
Thus, their argument concluded, the ponds added no pollutants to the
creeks which were not already present, and,- consequently, they had no
duty to treat the AMD." As a corollary to these arguments, defen-
dant Law maintained that he did not know of the pollution problem
when he bought the property. 7 On this point, three people testified to
the contrary.88
The district court rejected these defenses. Instead, the court in-
structed the jury that regardless of the original source of the AMD, as
owners of the point sources, i.e., the ponds, defendants had a legal
obligation not to discharge the pollutant without a NPDES permit.8 9
The court also told the jury that defendant Law's knowledge of the
discharges was what was crucial, not his knowledge of the pollution
problem at the time he purchased the property.
So instructed, the jury convicted Law and MMI on sixteen
countsY0 Subsequently, the Fourth Circuit affirmed.91 It is the
authors' belief that the impact of this decision will be felt in the coal
fields, and beyond, for many years.
V. LAw AND THE CWA
The Law opinion, remarkable for its brevity, nonetheless makes
one thing perfectly clear-the CWA means what it says, even when
applied in the context of AMD generated by abandoned coal opera-
tions. This message is unmistakable in the Fourth Circuit's rejection of
defendants' attempts to find defenses to the charges. The opinion's
central teaching-that the plain language of the CWA must be given
85. J.A., supra note 58, at 284-85, 294.
86. Def. Br. 23-32.
87. J.A., supra note 58, at 328-44, 405-10.
88. 1& at 72-73, 114-18, 182-84.
89. Law, 979 F.2d at 977; L.A., supra note 58, at 489-90.
90. l.A., supra note 58, at 20.
91. Law, 979 F.2d at 978.
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full force-will inform application of the statute well beyond the coal
fields. This becomes apparent after analysis of the court's refusal to
recognize the proffered defenses.
A. No Requirement of Proof That a Defendant Created the Pollutants
Defendants steadfastly contended that they had no responsibility
under the CWA to stop the discharge of pollutants from MM's ponds
because the United States could not prove that they were the original
creators, or generators, of the AMD.92 They based this contention on
their evidence that the AMD was not generated on their property. De-
fendants argued that since they had not "caused" the AMD, they had
no duty to stop its discharge.93 To this end, defendants offered jury
instructions that would have required acquittals unless the United
States proved that they "generated" the pollutants. 4 They also re-
quested instructions that, as surface owners, they "had no duty to treat
waters contaminated by the property's subsurface."
95
The United States took the position that even assuming arguendo
that the pollutants did originate from property beyond defendants'
control, they were still forbidden to discharge those pollutants without
a permit. The United States maintained that this was so because the
CWA forbids unpermitted discharges from "point sources" and MMI
unquestionably owned the point sources from which the AMD was dis-
charged.6
The trial court agreed, refusing to give defendants' proffered in-
structions. Instead, the jury was told:
[l]t is not a defense to the charge that the water discharged from the point
source came from some other place or places before its discharge from the
point source. It is not a defense to this action that some, or all, of the
pollutants discharged from a point source originated at places not on the
92. Def. Br. 24.
93. Def. Br. 24, 28-29.
94. Law, 979 F.2d at 979 n".
95. IaL
96. Brief of the United States at 24-29, United States v. Law, 979 F.2d 977 (4th Cir.
1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1844 (1993).
[Vol. 95:663
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defendants' property. This is because the offense consists of the knowing
discharge of a pollutant from a point source into a water of the United
States [without, or in violation of, a NPDES permit].7
In affirming the trial court's decision, the Court of Appeals made
the point as succinctly as possible: "The origin of the pollutants in the
treatment and collection ponds is therefore irrelevant. The proper focus
is upon the discharge from the ponds into Wolf and Arbuckle
Creeks.""8 This holding is imminently sensible. In fact, to have held
otherwise would have fatally undermined the statute.
The CWA does not regulate the generation of pollutants, but rath-
er the addition of pollutants into this nation's waters.' To have
adopted defendants' position would have been to read into the term
"discharge" a generation/creation aspect which would have hamstrung
the CWA. Taken to its logical conclusion, defendants' theory that
causation (original generation of the pollutants) is inherent in discharge
would completely eviscerate the CWA. For example, sewage treatment
works, which by definition do not cause or generate the pollutants they
discharge, plainly fall under the NPDES permit program."° Under
defendants' proposed construction of the statute, such works would no
longer be subject to CWA regulation, a result clearly contrary to Con-
gressional intent. For that matter, under defendants' theory, anyone
could discharge pollutants with impunity, as long as those pollutants
were generated by someone else. 1 In the coal fields, the CWA
could be defeated simply by severing the AMD producing estate, the
subsurface, from the AMD discharging estate, the surface. Certainly,
97. Law, 979 F.2d at 979; J.A., supra note 58, at 489-90.
98. Law, 979 F.2d at 979.
99. National Resource Defense Council v. EPA, 859 F.2d 156, 170 (D.C. Cir. 1988)
(CWA jurisdiction limited to regulating discharge of pollutants).
100. This is obvious from the numerous provisions of the CWA devoted to such
treatment works. E.g., 33 U.S.C. §§ 1281-99 (1988 & Supp. 1991); Shanty Town Assocs.
Ltd. Partnership v. EPA, 843 F.2d 782, 785 (4th Cir. 1988).
101. As the district court stated in denying defendants' motion for acquittal at the end
of the United States' case, "The surface that was purchased certainly includes the treatment
facilities and that was, to some extent, operational. And to allow the continued discharge of
these pollutants into the streams by saying, 'Well, I didn't buy that gob pile' is just illog-
ical to this Court." J.A., supra note 58, at 242.
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the CWA was not intended to produce results so contrary to its broad
remedial purposes.1°2
To put it another way, the CWA does have a "causation" require-
ment. However, to "cause" the illegal act under the CWA one does
not have to generate pollutants; one merely has to discharge pollut-
ants.'03 In the context of subsurface-generated AMD, this holding, of
course, does not mean that a subsurface owner that does not own the
surface cannot be prosecuted under the CWA. The federal aiding and
abetting statute"° specifically allows the prosecution of individuals
who knowingly "cause" others to violate the law. In the context of
general criminal litigation, such prosecutions are common. There is no
reason why they cannot be extended to this genre of CWA prosecu-
tion. In any event, the Law decision removes all doubt that one is
liable for point source discharges-regardless of the original source of
the pollutants discharged.
B. A Water Treatment System is a Point Source
The defendants also challenged their convictions on the ground
that Wolf and Arbuckle Creeks originated, and were polluted, before
entering their collection ponds and, thus, because the ponds added no
additional pollutants to the waters, they were not regulated by the
CWA. a5 They based this contention on evidence that the original
102.. E.g., Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 51-52 (1987) (a statute should
be interpreted to effectuate its object and policy).
103. This is the aspect of the United States case that defendants (and the NATIONAL
REVIEW) found so unprecedented in the common law. Precedent, however, is no more dis-
tant than the 1977 decision in Commonwealth v. Barnes & Tucker Co., 371 A.2d 461 (Pa.
1977). There, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, based in part on the common law theory
of public nuisance, ordered a mine owner to abate AMD discharges even though fifty per-
cent or more of the AMD came from other property. Id. at 465-67. In so holding, the court
ruled that "[ilt is not the source of the polluted water, but the source of the discharge of
the [AMD] into the waters of the Commonwealth with which we are presently concerned."
IM. at 466. Similarly, the court rejected a claim of no duty to abate because the nui-
sance/discharges arose from past activities. Id. at 467.
104. 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1988).
105. Law, 979 F.2d at 978-79.
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headwaters of the stream extended to the area now covered by the gob
pile and that their ponds lay in the original streambeds. 6
The legal foundation of this argument rested entirely on
defendants' analogy of their ponds to power plants and dams. A long
line of cases has held that power plants and dams, which merely divert
or accumulate waters of the United States, and then release those
waters, do not require NPDES permits because they do not physically
add pollutants from the outside world into those waters. 07 This is so
even though the operation of these facilities does affect the physical
characteristics of the waters.' Moreover, such facilities are not re-
quired to remove from the waters the pollutants already contained
therein.1°9
The Fourth Circuit found this analogy unpersuasive, with good
reason. The court based its decision on two grounds. First, because the
ponds were part of a water treatment system, the waters in them were,
by regulation, not waters of the United States."' Thus, by necessary
implication, whether those waters originated from Wolf and Arbuckle
Creeks was irrelevant because once they entered the treatment system,
they ceased to be waters of the United States. Consequently, .an unper-
nitted AMD discharge from either pond into either Wolf or Arbuckle
Creeks is an addition of a pollutant into a water of the United States,
prohibited by the CWA."' Second, as parts of a water treatment sys-
106. Def. Br. 15, 17, 26-31.
107. Law, 979 F.2d at 979 (citing National Wildlife Fed'n v. Consumers Power Co.,
862 F.2d 580 (6th Cir. 1988)); National Wildlife Fed'n v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156 (D.C.
Cir. 1982); Appalachian Power Co. v. Train, 545 F.2d 1351 (4th Cir. 1976)); see also Hud-
son River Fisherman's Ass'n v. City of New York, 751 F. Supp. 1088 (S.D.N.Y. 1991),
aff'd without opinion, 940 F.2d 649 (2d Cir. 1991).
108. See Consumers Power Co., 862 F.2d at 582 (additions of "entrained" fish and
other aquatic life); Gorsuch, 693 F.2d at 174 n.57 (changes in dissolved oxygen and miner-
al content).
109. Appalachian Power Co., 545 F.2d at 1322 (because power plants add no pollutants
to cooling water except heat, they cannot be required through a NPDES permit to remove
other pollutants already present in the water).
110. Law, 979 F.2d at 979 (citing 40 C.F.R. 122.2(g) (1991)) ("Waste treatment sys-
tems, including treatment ponds and lagoons designed to meet requirements of the
CWA ... are not waters of the United States.").
111. See Rayle Coal Co. v. Chief, Division of Natural Resources, 401 S.E.2d 682 (W.
Va. 1990). On facts remarkably similar to those in Law, in a case under the West Virginia
1993]
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tern, the ponds were, by statutory definition, point sources.11 2 Thus,
the case was clearly removed from the more ambiguous situations
posed by dams or power plants. 3
Although not relied upon by the court of appeals, the claim that
the headwaters of Wolf and Arbuckle Creeks are under the gob pile
was untenable for another reason. Any water under the gob pile, i.e.,
groundwater, would not meet the CWA's definition of a water of the
United States, which applies only to surface waters. 114 Consequently,
for purposes of the CWA, the Wolf and Arbuckle creeks that defen-
dants polluted no longer extended under the gob pile.
The conclusion that the waters in the ponds were not waters of
the United States, although apparently based in part on somewhat
technical statutory and regulatory definitions, is nonetheless grounded
in good common sense. Discharges of effluent from systems designed
to chemically treat pollutants are different in kind from releases of
untreated water from a dam or power plant. 115 Again, the implication
of the court's holding is clear: if one owns a point source which is
discharging pollutants into waters of the United States without a per-
mit, that person is in violation of the CWA regardless of where those
pollutants originated.
Water Control Act, W. VA. CODE § 20-5A-1 to -24 (1989 & Supp. 1992), the West Vir-
ginia Supreme Court of Appeals rejected the Consumers Power line of authority as "not
pertinent because Rayle's ponds added pollutants to the small stream." Id. at 606.
112. Law, 979 F.2d at 979 (citing 40 C.F.R. 122.2 (1991)) ("a 'point source' is
[among other things] . . . [a] landfill leachate collection system . . . from which pollutants
are or may be discharged".)
113. Law, 979 F.2d at 979-80.
114. See e.g., Kelley v. United States, 618 F. Supp. 1103, 1105-07 (W.D. Mich. 1985)
(CWA prohibits discharges to surface waters).
115. This fundamental difference reveals one passage of dicta in the court of appeals'
decision. In passing, the court noted that the district court's instruction-that it did not
matter whether the original source of all the pollutants lied beyond defendant's control-was
inaccurate in a stream diversion case. Law, 979 F.2d at 979. As the above discussion makes
clear, this was not a stream diversion case. Thus, as given in this case, the lower court's
instruction was correct in all respects.
[Vol. 95:663
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C. Knowledge at Discharge
The Law opinion also sheds light on the knowledge element of
criminal violations of the CWA. At trial, defendants intended to elicit
certain testimony regarding an alleged policy of the property's previous
owner to conceal environmental problems from prospective purchas-
ers.11 6 The thrust of this inquiry was to corroborate defendant Law's
contention that he was unaware of the AMD problem at the time de-
fendant MMI acquired the site." 7 The trial court excluded the evi-
dence.
In affirming, the Fourth Circuit ruled that exclusion of the evi-
dence was proper on relevance grounds. The relevant mens rea is
knowledge at the time of discharge, not at the time of acquisition of
the point source.1 Thus, the court made clear that a person's lack
of knowledge of a pollution problem at purchase in no way releases
the owner of his duty to either abate discharges or obtain a NPDES
permit.
D. Summary
Law stands for the proposition that a property owner's responsibil-
ities under the CWA are defined by the statute. There are no "inher-
ent" preconditions to those responsibilities such as original production
of the pollutants discharged or absolute knowledge of the discharge
before purchase of the property. The import of Law for the CWA is
that the statute's terms will be given their full force-even in criminal
prosecutions.
What does this mean for CWA enforcement in the coal fields?
Regulators and prosecutors now have the answers to questions that
have plagued them for years. First, it is now beyond dispute that sur-
face land owners are liable under the CWA for AMD discharged from
point sources on their property. This is so even if the AMD is gener-
116. Law, 979 F.2d at 980.
117. Def. Br. 18-19; J.A., supra note 58, at 348-50, 391.
118. Law, 979 F.2d at 980.
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ated from abandoned sites or from subsurface property or other surface
property in which the landowners have no interest.'" Moreover,
these persons are subject to regulation even though they may not have
fully appreciated the pollution problem at the time they purchased the
property.12 0 And, as Law makes clear, a knowing dereliction of these
obligations can result in serious criminal penalties.' Regulators now
have the tools necessary to combat the AMD problem head on.
VI. THE FUTURE OF CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT
IN THE COAL FIELDS
Criminal prosecution sits atop a pyramid of enforcement mecha-
nisms, all of which are geared to achieve one goal-full and voluntary
compliance with the law. Thus, any discussion of criminal enforcement
must necessarily encompass the noncriminal enforcement regime. In the
wake of Law, regulatory and civil enforcement in the coal fields will
undoubtedly increase.
It is evident that the West Virginia Division of Environmental
Protection (DEP) views Law as precedent for increased enforcement of
the CWA. Dr. Eli McCoy, Chief of the Water Resources Division of
DEP has warned prospective property buyers that, "[i]f you buy a
piece of property that has a source of pollutants on it, you have to
take responsibility for that land."'122 Relying upon Law, DEP Director
David C. Callaghan has directed the issuance of orders requiring sur-
face owners to treat AMD.1'2
The impact of the increase of regulation triggered by Law will be
magnified by a separate extension of the CWA into the coal fields.
Pursuant to the 1987 amendments to the CWA,l 24 on November 16,
119. Law, 979 F.2d at 979-80.
120. Id. at 980.
121. Id. at 978.
122. Paul Nyden, Water Polluter's Precedent-Setting Jail Term to Begin, CHARLESTON
SUNDAY GAZETTE-MAL, Mar. 15, 1992, 10A.
123. Preston Mine Owners Fight State Order, CHARLESTON DAILY MAIL, Sept. 28,
1992, at 12A.
124. The Water Quality Act of 1987,. Pub. L. No. 100-4, 101 Stat. 7 (1987) (codified
at 33 U.S.C..§§ 1251-1414a (1988)).
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1990, EPA issued final NPDES Application Regulations for Storm
Water Discharges."2 These regulations require, that point source dis-
charges of storm water 126 "associated with industrial activity"" be
permitted under the NPDES program.128  Such discharges include
those from "areas where industrial activity has taken place in the past
and significant materials remain and are exposed to storm water." 29
Specifically, the NPDES permit requirement applies to "active or inac-
tive mining operations" that discharge "storm water contaminated by
the contact with or that has came into contact with, any overbur-
den, 130 raw material, intermediate products, finished products, byprod-
ucts, or waste products located on site of such operations." 13' "Inac-
tive mining operations" are defined as "mining sites that are not being
actively mined, but which have an identifiable owner/operator."' 32
Such inactive operations do not include those mine sites satisfactorily
reclaimed under SMCRA. 33
EPA intended these regulations to answer many of the questions
that have plagued CWA enforcement to abandoned mine sites. The'
definition of point source is intended to be the "broadest possible...
consistent with the legislative intent of the CWA and court interpreta-
tion to include any identifiable conveyance from which pollutants
125. 55 Fed. Reg. 47,990 (1990).
126. "Storm water means storm water runoff, and surface runoff and drainage." 40
C.F.R. § 122.26(b)(13) (1991).
127. "'Storm water discharge associated with industrial activity' means the discharge
from any conveyance which is used for collecting and conveying storm water and which is
directly related to manufacturing, processing or raw materials storage areas, or an industrial
plant." 40 C.F.R. § 122.26(b)(14) (1991).
128. 40 C.F.R. § 122.6(a)(2) (1991).
129. 40 C.F.R. § 122.26(b)(14) (1991).
130. "Overburden means any material of any nature, consolidated or unconsolidated,
that overlies a mineral deposit, excluding tropical or similar naturally occurring surface
material that are not distributed by mining operations." 40 C.F.R. § 122.26(b)(10) (1991).
131. 40 C.F.R. § 122.26(b)(14)(iii) (1991). This language comports with the mandate of
33 U.S.C. § 1341(e)(2) that a permit is not required for point source discharges of storm
water that do not come into contact with overburden, raw materials, or waste products.
132. 40 C.F.R. § 122.26(b)(14)(iii) (1991). "Inactive mining sites" are not those being
maintained prior to mineral extraction or where minimal activity is present only to maintain
a mining claim. L
133. 40 C.F.R. § 122.26(b)(14)(iii) (1991). SMCRA reclamation requires steps to abate
AMD discharges. 30 U.S.C. § 1266 (1988).
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might enter the waters of the United States." 134 This definition in-
cludes, among other things, naturally eroded gullies carrying surface
water runoff from spoil piles associated with a coal mining opera-
tion.135 Moreover, as the court did in Law, EPA has made it clear
that, generally speaking, the duty to treat storm water discharges exists
"regardless of the initial source of the discharges."136 Moreover, be-
cause of the serious pollution problem, EPA expressly rejected industry
claims that regulation of storm water discharges from inactive sites
posed an "unreasonable hardship." 137 The necessary effect of these
new regulations, like that of Law, is to begin to close the regulatory
loophole through which AMD has discharged from an untold number
of abandoned mine sites for years. Thus far, the regulations have sur-
vived industry challenge. 1
38
In West Virginia, Dr. McCoy has already publicly commented that
these new regulations empower DEP to "require permits from owners
of old gob piles and poorly reclaimed mines that are creating storm
runoff pollution problems."' 39 In McCoy's words, the regulations
"could be the most significant development for the improvement of
West Virginia streams in a long time. ' ' 40
In an effort to implement the new regulations in West Virginia,
DEP is considering the following guidelines for determining which
owners of abandoned mine sites should apply for NPDES permits:
134. 55 Fed. Reg. 47997 (1990).
135. See Sierra Club v. Abston Constr. Co., 620 F.2d 41, 45 (5th Cir. 1980).
136. 55 Fed. Reg. 48,010 (1990).
137. 55 Fed. Reg. 48,033 (1990).
138. American Mining Congress v. EPA, 965 F.2d 759 (9th Cir. 1992).
139. Rick Steelhammer, Opinion May Assist in Cleanup of Streams, CHARLESTON GA-
ZETTE, Nov. 12, 1992, at B1.
140. Id
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CATEGORY I
Permit Required if 1 is True and Either 2, 3 or 4 is Also True:
1 Site contributing pollutants during storm event
2 Current owner of site same entity that mined the site
3 Current owner was surface or mineral owner when
property was mined
4 Current owner received financial benefits from the
mining that caused the problem
CATEGORY I
May Be Required to Obtain Permit at Some Point
if 1 is True and Either 2 or 3 is True:
1 Site contributing pollutants during storm events
2 Current owner (land of surface) had no involvement in
previous mining operation
3 Current owner was owner of surface or minerals when
originally mined
CATEGORY Il
No Need to Apply for Permit if 1 is True:
1 1 No contribution of pollutants during storm e v e n t "'
141. Letter from Dr. Laidley Eli McCoy, Chief of the Water Resources Division of
DEP, to Philip B. Scott, Assistant United States Attorney, Southern District of West Virgin-
ia (Nov. 18, 1992) (on file with author).
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These guidelines make clear that enforcement of the storm water regu-
lations will focus on those who created or benefitted from the mining
activity that generated the pollutants.
Between the new storm water regulations, the proposed implemen-
tation guidelines, and the holding in Law, CWA enforcement in the
coal fields may reach a new and unprecedented level. More property
owners will be regulated than ever before. As many as 4,000 new sites
may potentially require NPDES permits in West Virginia alone.
142
Undoubtedly, until the ramifications of these recent developments are
fully appreciated, there will be uncertainty and confusion in the regu-
lated community. Enforcement efforts must be geared to educating the
public and initiating the permitting process for previously unpermitted
sites. Property owners must be encouraged to cooperate in this effort
and undertake full compliance with the CWA. Encouraging prompt
compliance will be the most efficient way to make immediate and
significant gains on the AMD problem.
In this context, criminal enforcement plays a crucial, albeit limited,
role. Property owners who come forward, initiating the permitting
process in an attempt to comply with the law, should reap the benefit
of their good faith. To prosecute these individuals for past discharges
would be counterproductive. Deterrence is, as one commentator has put
it, the "overarching goal" of environmental prosecution. 143 To punish
those who are making genuine efforts to conform their conduct with
the law thus would defeat the very purpose of prosecution.
DEP takes the same view. The agency has devoted two full-time
employees to assist businesses and other property owners in coming
into compliance with the new storm water discharge regulations. 44
Recognizing that the new regulations encompass many who never have
been exposed to the permitting process and who may previously have
been in violation of the CWA, DEP has decided to encourage property
owners to avail themselves of assistance by instructing the two em-
142. Id
143. Habicht, supra note 6, at 10,480.
144. Susan Williams, Regulations Target Rainwater Runoff, CHARLESTON GAZETrE, Dec.
15, 1992, at ID, 5D.
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ployees not to share information with the agency's law enforcement
personnel.
145
Prosecution of those who manifest contempt for regulation, howev-
er, must continue to be a top priority. The success of the CWA, like
other environmental laws, rests in voluntary compliance by the regulat-
ed community. Those who seek to operate outside the system, thumb-
ing their noses at regulatory efforts, must be brought to justice. To
ignore such conduct would encourage noncompliance. At a time when
the CWA is being extended into the coal fields as never before, the
message must go out to the regulated community that intentional disre-
gard of the CWA may have dire consequences. Consequently, in the
upcoming years, criminal prosecution will continue to play a signifi-
cant role in CWA enforcement.
VII. CONCLUSION
For the first time, the CWA is now unquestionably poised to
address the AMD problem in the coal fields. In Law, criminal enforce-
ment played an important role in solidifying the legal bases for appli-
cation of the CWA at abandoned mine sites. Recent storm water dis-
charge regulations ensure that regulators will indeed begin to enforce
the CWA at many of these locations. Criminal enforcement will most
certainly again play an important role in that effort. The end result
should be real progress in controlling AMD, one of Appalachia's most
devastating and intractable water pollutant problems.
145. a
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APPENDIX A-SUMMERLEE SITE
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